British recognized the difficulties of the US position on Iraq in 2002

Ray McGovern has published an essay worth excerpting.

McGovern writes that: At that meeting [July 23, 2002], Foreign Secretary Jack Straw noted that the evidence regarding "weapons of mass destruction" was "thin."

McGovern quotes a July 21, 2002 briefing paper:
U.S. views of international law vary from that of the U.K. and the international community. Regime change per se is not a proper basis for military action under international law...Legal bases for an invasion of Iraq are in principle conceivable...but would be difficult to establish because of, for example, the tests of immediacy and proportionality.

A few more excerpts from McGovern's essay:

Grasping at straws, the document raises the possibility of demanding Iraqi acceptance of an unacceptably intrusive U.N. inspection regime:

It is just possible that an ultimatum could be cast in terms which Saddam would reject (because he is unwilling to accept unfettered access)....However, failing that (or an Iraqi attack) we would be most unlikely to achieve a legal base for military action by January 2003.

The British, you see, knew that the summer months in Iraq are uncomfortably hot. Thus, January was the time they thought an invasion would have to begin, or the attack would have to be put off until autumn. As for a possible attack by Iraq, British government documents released to Parliament show that American and British aircraft dropped no bombs on Iraq in March 2002, 10 tons of bombs in July, and 54.6 tons in September. Nevertheless, this failed to provoke Saddam Hussein into the kind of reaction that could be used as an ostensible casus belli. And intrusive inspections? Iraq wound up tolerating the strictest inspection regime in modern history. And when U.N. inspectors found Al Samoud missiles with a range greater than that permitted, Saddam allowed them to be destroyed.

One can visualize the British lawyers wringing their hands: Foiled again.
***

To his credit, British Admiral Michael Boyce, chief of the defense staff, demanded a straightforward, written opinion from the attorney general that attacking Iraq would be lawful, before Boyce would put his troops at risk of subsequent prosecution as war criminals.

This put the bite on Attorney General Goldsmith who had long shared the doubts of the legal establishment about the legality of starting a war without unequivocal endorsement by the United Nations. After much equivocation, Goldsmith bowed to Blair and was asked to appear before the cabinet on March 17, 2003, two days before the war began. Goldsmith read a brief statement saying he now thought attacking Iraq was lawful, and Blair quickly moved the discussion on. Questions were not permitted. The British attorney general reportedly confided to lawyer friends during February and early March 2003 that he found himself in an "impossible" position, and wondered aloud if he should stay in the job.

Admiral Boyce, upset that he was never shown Goldsmith's more equivocal advice to Blair prior to March 17, has now said that if British troops are brought to trial by the International Criminal Court (ICC), British ministers should be "brought into the frame as well." The London Observer asked Boyce if Blair and Goldsmith should be included. "Too bloody right," was his answer.

American forces, of course, do not have to worry about the ICC, since the Bush administration "unsigned" the signature that President Bill Clinton had affixed to the treaty in December 2000. Nor have U.S. government officials shown themselves to be sticklers about international law. In November 2003, Richard Perle, then a key leader of the Defense Policy Board and a principal intellectual author of the invasion of Iraq, left international lawyers astonished when he told a London audience, "I think in this case international law stood in the way of doing the right thing."

Iraqi soldiers are "preschoolers with guns"

Jonathan Schell in a recent essay discussed the implications of a June 10 article in the Washington Post by Anthony Shadid and Steve Fainaru, Building Iraq's Army: Mission Improbable (page A01). A few excerpts:

The Post story starts with the lyrics of a song the soldiers of the unit, called Charlie Company, were singing out of earshot of their American overseers. It was a ballad to Saddam Hussein, and it ran:

We have lived in humiliation since you left
We had hoped to spend our life with you

The American press often discusses the political makeup of the insurgency, but no one until now has suggested that some of the very forces being trained by the United States might be longing for the return of Saddam.
***

Indeed, the soldiers of Charlie Company told Shadid and Fainaru that seventeen of them had quit in recent days. They added that every one of them planned to do the same as soon as possible. Their reasons were simple. They were bitter at the United States. "Look at the homes of the Iraqis," one soldier remarked. "The people have been destroyed." When asked by whom, he answered, "Them" -- and pointed to the Americans leading the patrol. The Iraqis had enlisted in the new army only for the salary -- $340 per month, an enviable sum in today's ruined Iraq. But the money had come at the price of self-respect. The new recruits had been bought off and hated themselves for it. One said that after they had all quit, "We'll live by God, but we'll have our respect."

One might wonder whether the reporters had deliberately or unknowingly picked an exceptionally rebellious unit. But in fact, Charlie Company was selected by the U.S. Army itself, presumably eager to put its best foot forward.

The American officers' response to their sullen recruits is of a piece with the entire American effort in Iraq. The officers treat their charges as if, owing to certain mysterious personal defects, they somehow are not quite up to the job they have been given. After a typical episode in which the unit was attacked and ran away (four hailed taxis to make their escape), Sgt. Rick McGovern, who leads the unit, dressed them down. "You are all cowards," he informed them. He went on, "My soldiers are over here, away from our families for a year. We are willing to die for you to have freedom. You should be willing to die for your own freedom." The tongue-lashing assumed that the Iraqis and the American shared a cause that, as the story shows, was actually 100 percent missing. Iraqi men who hate the American occupation are not cowards if they decline to shoot other men who are fighting the occupation. On the contrary, the more courage they had, the less they would engage in such a fight. The men of Charlie Company do indeed lack courage -- courage to turn down the money they accept for pretending to fight for a cause they despise. Their most cowardly moment, given their beliefs, was when they sat still while Sergeant McGovern called them cowards.

The Post article itself is well worth reading. A few excerpts:

The Iraqi soldiers were a grim lot, patrolling streets where they lived and mosques where they worshiped. As they entered their neighborhoods, some of them donned black balaclavas and green scarves to mask their identities.
***

"Honestly, I don't think people in America understand how touchy the situation really is right now," McGovern said. "We have the military power, the military might, but we're handling everything with kid gloves because we're hoping the Iraqis are going to step up and start taking things on themselves. But they don't have a clue how to do it."

Asked when he thought the Iraqi soldiers might be ready to operate independently, McGovern said: "Honestly, there's part of me that says never. There's some cultural issues that I don't think they'll ever get through."

McGovern added that the Iraqis had "come a long way in a very short period of time" and predicted they would ultimately succeed. But he said the effort was still in its infancy.

"We like to refer to the Iraqi army as preschoolers with guns," he said.
***

It's interesting how frequently colonial powers adopt child metaphors to refer to their subjects. Note also the inability to think the obvious, that Iraqi soldiers are n't taking over for the Americans - not because they're culturally incapable - but because they ultimately don't want to become more responsible puppets.

Almost to a man, the soldiers said they joined for the money -- a relatively munificent $300 to $400 a month. The military and police forces offered some of the few job opportunities in town. Even then, the soldiers were irate: They wanted more time off, air-conditioned quarters like their American counterparts and, most important, respect. Most frustrating, they said, was the two- or three-hour wait to be searched at the base's gate when they returned from leave.

The soldiers said 17 colleagues had quit in the past few days.

"In 15 days, we're all going to leave," Nawaf declared.

The two-dozen soldiers gathered nodded their heads.

"All of us," Khalaf said. "We'll live by God, but we'll have our respect."