Some Bolivia background
COHA has recently published an article
with some useful background on Morales and Bolivia. Some excerpts:
His fame was catapulted in the 2002 presidential race when the U.S embassy warned that if Morales was elected, the U.S. would cut off approximately $75 million in economic assistance and $48.5 million in counter narcotics aid to Bolivia. Washington’s interventionist strategy backfired, producing a public outrage that almost carried Morales to victory, with him losing the presidential election by only 1.5 percent of the popular vote.
...U.S. policymakers today are beginning to fear the further eclipse of American influence if Morales takes office in December. They also fear that under a Morales presidency, the new leader would waste no time in joining the de facto left-leaning South Atlantic Alliance consisting of Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay.
***
For nearly twenty years, the United States has pursued coca leaf eradication policies in rural Bolivia as a corollary to its heavily financed “War on Drugs.” These eradication efforts include initiatives that range from aerial herbicide spraying to crop replacement sustainability programs.
***
Opposition to this source-crop eradication strategy is rife among Bolivians, the majority of whom belong to indigenous ethnic groups. These bodies maintain that coca is an Andean product whose domestication and use have been a part of indigenous culture for thousands of years. They feel their right to cultural determination and political autonomy should take precedent over the addiction of Americans to a relatively new European concoction.
***
Despite the stringent legal framework established to impede coca production, yearly coca replanting rates have far exceeded eradication rates, and total coca crop growth in Bolivia has continued to increase since 2000.
***
Since the coca wars began in the late 1980s, clashes between security forces and peasant coca activists have left 57 coca growers dead and have paved the way for many human rights abuses. In 1995, in a dramatic move to step up the anti-drug war, security forces imposed a state of siege on selected rural villages and many peasant coca leaders were arrested without warrants. One thousand UMOPAR troops were dispatched to five small villages in the Chapare region, and the ensuing confrontation resulted in the deaths of six peasants and the wounding of ten others by the time the occupation had ended.
***
At present, 70 percent of the 8.4 million Bolivians live below the poverty line. Most rural communities lack electricity and running water, and the country’s rates of infant and child mortality are the highest in South America. Coca eradication strategies cost Bolivians a total of $500 million each year.
Note that Jim Shultz has recently commented in his blog that Evo has little chance of being elected president. True or not, it is clear that his election cannot by itself lead to a successful revolution in Bolivia.
with some useful background on Morales and Bolivia. Some excerpts:
His fame was catapulted in the 2002 presidential race when the U.S embassy warned that if Morales was elected, the U.S. would cut off approximately $75 million in economic assistance and $48.5 million in counter narcotics aid to Bolivia. Washington’s interventionist strategy backfired, producing a public outrage that almost carried Morales to victory, with him losing the presidential election by only 1.5 percent of the popular vote.
...U.S. policymakers today are beginning to fear the further eclipse of American influence if Morales takes office in December. They also fear that under a Morales presidency, the new leader would waste no time in joining the de facto left-leaning South Atlantic Alliance consisting of Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay.
***
For nearly twenty years, the United States has pursued coca leaf eradication policies in rural Bolivia as a corollary to its heavily financed “War on Drugs.” These eradication efforts include initiatives that range from aerial herbicide spraying to crop replacement sustainability programs.
***
Opposition to this source-crop eradication strategy is rife among Bolivians, the majority of whom belong to indigenous ethnic groups. These bodies maintain that coca is an Andean product whose domestication and use have been a part of indigenous culture for thousands of years. They feel their right to cultural determination and political autonomy should take precedent over the addiction of Americans to a relatively new European concoction.
***
Despite the stringent legal framework established to impede coca production, yearly coca replanting rates have far exceeded eradication rates, and total coca crop growth in Bolivia has continued to increase since 2000.
***
Since the coca wars began in the late 1980s, clashes between security forces and peasant coca activists have left 57 coca growers dead and have paved the way for many human rights abuses. In 1995, in a dramatic move to step up the anti-drug war, security forces imposed a state of siege on selected rural villages and many peasant coca leaders were arrested without warrants. One thousand UMOPAR troops were dispatched to five small villages in the Chapare region, and the ensuing confrontation resulted in the deaths of six peasants and the wounding of ten others by the time the occupation had ended.
***
At present, 70 percent of the 8.4 million Bolivians live below the poverty line. Most rural communities lack electricity and running water, and the country’s rates of infant and child mortality are the highest in South America. Coca eradication strategies cost Bolivians a total of $500 million each year.
Note that Jim Shultz has recently commented in his blog that Evo has little chance of being elected president. True or not, it is clear that his election cannot by itself lead to a successful revolution in Bolivia.
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